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Abstract:  In modern economics, consumers’ surplus is understood as the sum of individuals’ 
compensating variations, defined by reference to well-behaved preferences.  If individuals 
lack integrated preferences, as behavioural economics suggests they often do, consumers’ 
surplus cannot be defined.  However, Dupuit – the earliest theorist of consumers’ surplus – 
did not assume integrated preferences.  His concept of consumers’ surplus can be interpreted 
in terms of the maximum yield of discriminatory prices.  In principle, this can be measured 
without making assumptions about preferences, but (contrary to what Dupuit apparently 
thought) is not in general equal to the area under the observed demand curve.   
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‘Hence the saying which we shall often repeat because it is often forgotten: the only real 
utility is that which people are willing to pay for’ (Jules Dupuit, 1844/ 1952, p. 262).  
 
Consumers’ surplus is one of the most important theoretical constructs in applied welfare 
economics.  It plays an essential part in normative economic analyses of competition policy, 
of price regulation for natural monopolies, and of public provision of non-marketed goods 
such as road space, flood protection and free health care.  It fits into a well-understood and 
internally consistent theoretical and philosophical framework.  According to received 
economic theory, consumers’ surplus is a measure of compensating variation – that is, of the 
change in an individual’s money income which, if combined with the policy or project under 
consideration, would leave that individual’s utility unchanged.  In this theory, ‘utility’ is 
understood as an ordinal representation of an individual’s stable preference ordering over 
relevant outcomes, and is assumed to be revealed in the individual’s decisions.  
Philosophically, analyses that use consumer’s surplus measurements are often interpreted as 
incremental exercises in welfarism – that is, exercises that aim to increase social welfare, 
where social welfare is understood as an aggregate of individuals’ welfares, and preference-
satisfaction is used as the criterion of individual welfare.  But this whole framework rests on 
the assumption that individuals really do have stable and coherent preference orderings.  
What if they don’t?          
 That is not an idle question.  Research in experimental and behavioural economics has 
generated a large body of evidence of systematic patterns in individuals’ choices that cannot 
plausibly be explained as the product of consistent preferences.  Given what economic theory 
has traditionally regarded as a fully-defined decision problem, different ‘frames’ or ‘cues’ 
can activate different mental processes and generate different decision outcomes.  For 
example, decisions may be influenced by apparently irrelevant but psychologically salient 
‘anchors’ (e.g. Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1968; Ariely, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2003), by 
whether given changes in outcomes are framed as gains or losses (e.g. Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979), and by whether the decision-maker’s affective engagement with the problem 
is ‘hot’ or ‘cold’ (e.g. Loewenstein, 2005).  Even under controlled laboratory conditions, 
individuals’ responses to two presentations of exactly the same simple decision problem 
within the space of a few minutes can reveal a high degree of stochastic variation (e.g. 
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Becker, DeGroot and Marschak, 1964; Loomes, Moffatt and Sugden, 2002).  Notice that the 
common feature of these cases is not that individuals are acting on preferences that violate 
conventional conditions such as transitivity, convexity or non-satiation.  Nor is it that 
individuals are making errors in maximising given utility functions.  It is that each 
individual’s preferences, whatever their properties, are liable to change from one moment to 
another and from one choice problem to another.  I shall say that such preferences are not 
integrated.  
 From the perspective of cognitive psychology, it is not particularly surprising that 
choice behaviour can be affected by cues that a theory of rational choice would treat as 
arbitrary, or that choice processes can be inherently stochastic.  However, these observations 
pose severe problems for neoclassical welfare economics.  The usual justification for using 
preference-satisfaction as a normative criterion is that each individual’s preferences express 
her judgements about the determinants of her well-being.  But many of the factors that have 
been found to influence preferences cannot plausibly be treated as relevant for well-being.  If 
individual behaviour does not reveal integrated preferences, what are we to make of a form of 
normative analysis whose criterion is preference-satisfaction? 
 At first sight, it might seem that this problem can be safely ignored in many practical 
applications of the concept of consumer’s surplus.  In the context of competition and price 
regulation, or of the cost-benefit analysis of public projects, the consumers’ surplus 
measurements that are usually needed are ones that aggregate over the behaviour of many 
individuals and over extended periods of time.  If there is a stable demand function that 
allows average purchases of a good by consumers as a whole to be predicted from data about 
prices and average incomes, aggregate changes in consumer’s surplus resulting from given 
price changes can be calculated using standard techniques.  Does it then matter whether the 
individual consumers whose behaviour generated those data acted on integrated preferences?  
The premise of the present paper is that, if we retain the received interpretation of 
consumers’ surplus and of its role in normative economics, this does matter.   
 According to the received interpretation, the object of welfare economics is to 
discover how best to secure individuals’ well-being, and each individual’s well-being is to be 
measured by the degree to which his assumedly integrated preferences are satisfied.  Given 
these premises, data that aggregate across choices that (for any given individual) have been 
influenced by different arbitrary cues at different moments are not fit for purpose.  That is 
true even if, at the level of aggregation we are using, the data could have been generated by a 
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hypothetical set of ideally rational consumers: the object is supposed to be to satisfy the 
preferences of actual consumers, not those of imaginary ones. 
 But do we have to accept the interpretation of consumers’ surplus that leads to this 
negative conclusion?  I will argue that an alternative interpretation is possible – one which 
breaks the theoretical link between consumers’ surplus and integrated preferences.  The 
intuition behind my proposal is expressed in the quotation from Dupuit that I have used as my 
epigraph.  Dupuit is justly recognised as the founding father of cost-benefit analysis and as 
the first economist to develop a concept of consumers’ surplus.  For Dupuit, this concept is 
based on what he treats as a fundamental principle of economics: the only real utility is that 
which people are willing to pay for.  I will ask whether it is possible to define a concept of 
consumers’ surplus that is based on what individuals are willing to pay for a good, at the 
moment at which they buy it, and in the frame in which they buy it.  Such a concept would 
not need any concept of an individual’s preferences, utility or well-being that extended across 
different moments or different frames.  I will argue that Dupuit’s analysis of consumers’ 
surplus suggests that he had some such concept in mind.  
1.  Behavioural welfare economics and the opportunity criterion 
My proposed interpretation of consumers’ surplus fits into an approach to the problem of 
reconciling normative and behavioural economics that I have developed and defended in 
previous papers (Sugden, 2004, 2007, 2013; McQuillin and Sugden, 2012).  In this section, I 
give a brief account of this approach, against the background of a more orthodox alternative. 
 A consensus seems to be developing among behavioural economists in favour of a 
particular strategy for dealing with normative issues, which I will call behavioural welfare 
economics.1  This strategy, proposed by (among others) Sunstein and Thaler (2003), 
Bernheim and Rangel (2007) and Kőszegi and Rabin (2007), uses the satisfaction of revealed 
preferences as the normative criterion whenever those preferences are well-defined and free 
of ‘mistakes’.  However, when an individual’s choices between options vary according to 
(supposedly) arbitrary context-specific cues, the preferences revealed in those choices are not 
necessarily respected.  Instead, the welfare economist tries to reconstruct the preferences that 
the individual would have revealed, had she not made mistakes; implicitly, these latent 
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preferences are assumed to be context-independent.  In Bernheim and Rangel’s variant of this 
approach, preferences are guaranteed respect only if they are revealed in ‘non-suspect’ 
situations in which the individual’s reasoning is not likely to be impaired.  Clearly, the logic 
of behavioural welfare economics implies that consumer’s surplus measurements are not 
suitable for use in applied welfare economics unless one can be confident that they are based 
on context-independent preferences that are error-free (or non-suspect). 
 In my proposed approach, in contrast, the normative criterion is not well-being or the 
satisfaction of integrated preferences; it is opportunity.  The essential idea is that an 
individual’s opportunities are described by the set of alternative time-profiles of consumption 
and holdings of goods that he can attain by acts of choice.  This set is the individual’s 
opportunity set.  Unambiguous expansions of an opportunity set are treated as improvements 
for the individual concerned, because they allow him greater scope to act according to his 
preferences – whatever these may turn out to be and whether or not they are stable from one 
decision problem to another.   If one presupposed the normative framework of mainstream 
welfare economics, this criterion would perhaps be hard to defend.  But the framework I use 
makes two significant breaks with mainstream welfare economics, which together make the 
criterion less counter-intuitive.  
 The first break is with the idea that normative economics is addressed to an imagined 
‘social planner’ whose objective is to maximise the overall welfare of a society, and that the 
object of normative analysis is to arrive at ‘policy implications’ that this planner would want 
to implement.  My approach is contractarian in the sense of Buchanan (1968, 1975).  By this, 
I mean that normative economics is addressed to private individuals, viewed as potential 
parties to voluntary agreements.  Given this approach, the relevant question to ask about a 
normative criterion such as preference-satisfaction or opportunity is not whether it 
corresponds with the relevant individual’s well-being, as that is viewed by a benevolent 
social planner.  It is whether it represents that individual’s interests, as he or she perceives 
them.        
 The second break is with the idea that the continuing identity of a person across 
decision problems is represented by the existence of an integrated set of consistent 
preferences, and hence that an individual who acts on non-integrated preferences is not a 
unitary decision-making agent.  There is a long tradition in economics of modelling a person 
who acts on inconsistent preferences as a collection of distinct transient selves, each of which 
is then treated as an agent with its own preferences, interacting strategically with other selves.  
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This modelling strategy is often used to represent problems of time-inconsistency and self-
control (e.g. Strotz, 1955–56; Schelling, 1984).  Normative analysis then usually proceeds 
either by privileging the preferences of one of the selves (typically the self that is judged most 
rational or reflective) or by treating the different selves as though they were distinct 
individuals.  My approach differs by treating the identity of a person over time as a 
continuing locus of responsibility.  To understand your identity in this way is to accept the 
authority of each of your transient selves with respect to the decisions that it is called on to 
make, rather than to evaluate all those decisions against a single integrated set of preferences.  
This allows you to see any expansion in your opportunity set as good for you as a continuing 
person, without needing to ask what your future preferences will be. 
 In this framework, the analogue of Pareto efficiency as a normative principle is the 
Opportunity Criterion. This criterion assesses regimes for a given economy, a regime being a 
profile of opportunity sets, one such set for each individual.  Intuitively, the Opportunity 
Criterion requires that all opportunities for feasible transactions that individuals might want 
to make are available to them in their respective opportunity sets.  ‘Might want’ here is to be 
interpreted without reference to individuals’ actual preferences.  Rather than treating 
preferences as given, the criterion takes the viewpoint of individuals who have not yet 
thought about, not yet decided, or not yet discovered what their preferences will be.  Thus, it 
takes account of the whole range of preferences on which each individual might want to act – 
including preferences that are context-dependent or that vary from moment to moment during 
the process of trading.  The only assumption that is made about preferences (and this is made 
only implicitly) is that in the case of ‘money’ – the good that serves as the medium of 
exchange – more is always preferred to less.  (Notice that this is not an assumption about the 
consistency of an individual’s preferences across contexts or across time.  It is an assumption 
about behaviour that applies in any given context and at any given time.)  Let us say that a 
person is willing to pay for something if (at the moment at which he chooses to buy) he is 
willing to pay enough to make others willing to play their parts in supplying it to him (at the 
moments at which they choose to sell).  A regime that satisfies the Opportunity Criterion, one 
can then say, allows each individual to get whatever he wants and is willing to pay for, 
whenever he wants it and is willing to pay for it.  One can also say that, if the Opportunity 
Criterion is satisfied, there is no feasible putative transaction such that everyone who would 
be party to it wants to engage in it, but it has not been realised.  Thus, that criterion can be 
interpreted as equivalent to the absence of unrealised opportunities for profitable arbitrage.  It 
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can be shown that the Opportunity Criterion is satisfied in any exchange economy in which 
the single-price law of markets holds and all markets clear, irrespective of whether 
individuals act on integrated preferences (Sugden, 2004; McQuillin and Sugden, 2012).   
 The Opportunity Criterion, as so far formulated, is adapted for the analysis of general 
equilibrium in exchange economies.  It does not have direct application to the partial 
equilibrium problems of cost-benefit analysis that Dupuit was concerned with and for which 
consumers’ surplus measurements are most useful.  However, I believe that the normative 
intuitions that underlie the Opportunity Criterion have some bearing on such problems. 
 Consider Dupuit’s paradigm example of a problem for cost-benefit analysis – the 
footbridge.  Suppose that an entrepreneur is considering building a footbridge over a river 
and charging tolls for crossing it.  He will incur costs in building and maintaining the bridge, 
but these costs are independent of the volume of traffic it will carry.  Even if no tolls were 
charged, the bridge would have more than enough capacity to meet the demand for it.  If the 
entrepreneur can design a tariff that will generate revenue in excess of costs, he will build the 
bridge; if not, not.  If the bridge is built and is profitable, one might say that the entrepreneur 
has mediated a mutually beneficial transaction between the bridge users and those people 
who supply the inputs necessary for building and operating the bridge.   
 In the spirit of the Opportunity Criterion, one might propose a criterion requiring that 
all opportunities for this kind of profitable arbitrage are exhausted, and that the actual profits 
made by arbitrage are zero.  The activity of bridge-building would satisfy such a criterion if 
the following conditions held:  (1) price discrimination is capable of appropriating any 
desired proportion (up to the whole) of consumers’ willingness-to-pay;  (2) bridges are built 
if and only if they are capable of being financed by discriminatory pricing; (3) the revenue 
generated by the prices actually charged exactly covers total costs; and (4) those prices do not 
deter any user who is willing to pay the marginal costs he imposes.  Clearly, these are not 
conditions that one can expect to be satisfied as an unintended outcome of profit-seeking 
behaviour in an unregulated market.  But one might think of them as an ideal to which the 
regulation of markets should aspire.  Designing a regulatory regime that approximates as 
closely as possible to this ideal is an example of the type of problem in which consumers’ 
surplus measurements are typically used.  This is precisely the problem that Dupuit set out to 
solve, and for which he developed the concept of consumers’ surplus. 
2.  Dupuit’s analysis of consumer’s surplus 
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The founding text of cost-benefit analysis is Dupuit’s (1844/ 1952) paper, ‘On the 
measurement of the utility of public works’.  This paper was intended to form a chapter in a 
never-completed book about the application of political economy to public works.  The 
primary subject of the paper is ‘the conditions which [public] works must fulfil in order to be 
really useful’ or ‘How, in a word, is public utility to be measured?’ (p. 255); Dupuit’s 
examples of public works include roads, railways, canals, bridges and water supply systems.  
In trying to answer this (as it might seem) practical question, he engages with debates, central 
to mid-nineteenth century economics, about the nature of utility and value. 
 Many features of Dupuit’s analysis will strike a modern economist as far ahead of its 
time.  What are now seen as fundamental principles of cost-benefit analysis – not only 
consumers’ surplus, but also the distinctions between real resource costs and transfer 
payments and between pecuniary and technological externalities, are presented for the first 
time.  Dupuit also presents the first analysis of price discrimination.  But there is one respect 
in which his analysis is strikingly different from later neoclassical theory: in theorising about 
choices made by consumers, he makes no explicit assumptions about rationality or utility-
maximisation.  By this, I do not mean to imply that Dupuit had no inkling of, or rejected as 
invariably false, the hypothesis that consumers seek to maximise the satisfaction they derive 
from the goods they are able to buy.  Historians of economic thought have pored over the 
economic writings of the mid-nineteenth century looking for insights that prefigure the 
‘marginal revolution’ of the 1870s.  It is not my intention to add to this enterprise.  My 
concern is only with how Dupuit uses the concept of consumers’ surplus in his 1844 paper.  
For my purposes, what matters is that he formulates this concept without making explicit 
assumptions about consumer rationality.  
 Indeed, Dupuit explicitly rejects the idea that the methods of political economy can be 
used to explain or predict consumer choice.  For example: ‘The variable, yea mobile, nature 
of the value of utility is indeed well known to business men and has long been exploited by 
them.  That is what lies behind all transactions that are sheltered from competition’ (p. 260).  
This remark about the behaviour of businesses that are sheltered from competition is a 
preface to Dupuit’s analysis of price discrimination.  To a modern reader, his account of 
consumer choice is more behavioural than neoclassical:  
The same commodity in various guises is often sold in different shops at quite 
different prices to the rich, the moderately well-off, and the poor.  The fine, the 
very fine, the superfine, and the extra fine, although drawn from the same barrel 
and although alike in all real respects other than the superlative on the label, sell at 
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widely different prices.  Why?  Because the same thing has a widely differing 
utility depending on the consumer.  If there were only one medium price, there 
would be a loss to those who did without the product because its utility to them 
was less than that price, and a loss to the seller who, from many buyers, would be 
receiving payment for only a fraction of the utility of the services rendered.  (p. 
261) 
Dupuit is clearly assuming that consumer choice (at least, when consumers are comfortably-
off) is governed by preferences that are labile and context-dependent, and that can be 
exploited by profit-seeking suppliers. 
  After defining what would now be called a demand function as a series of (price, 
quantity) pairs or ‘relationships’, he writes: 
This series of relationships is not known for any commodity, and it can even be 
said that it will never be known since it depends on the volatile will of human 
beings; it is today no longer what it was yesterday.  It is thus of no avail to try to 
determine this relationship exactly by experience or groping experiment, but there 
do exist certain general laws to which the relationship, in its very volatility, 
remains constantly subject.  (p. 277). 
Significantly, these ‘general laws’ are properties of functions which aggregate the demands 
of many individuals, and are justified as ‘fact[s] of experience’ which have been verified 
statistically, rather than as principles that can be explained in terms of rational choice by 
individuals.  Dupuit states two such laws.  The first is that demand curves slope downwards.  
The second is that, for any given demand curve, the gradient is more negative at higher 
prices.  This second law is explained as reflecting the ‘pyramid’ structure of social classes in 
the population over which demand functions aggregate (p. 277).  Implicitly, Dupuit also 
treats as a law the regularity that demand curves are approximately continuous, a regularity 
that is naturally interpreted as a result of aggregation across individuals. 
 Since Dupuit’s method of measuring the utility that consumers derive from public 
works uses only the data in the aggregated demand function, the implication is he believes 
that this measure is valid even if (as he clearly thinks is often the case) consumers’ 
preferences are ‘volatile’.  In other words, he is presenting consumers’ surplus as a measure 
that does not depend on assumptions about the integrated preferences of individual 
consumers.  If he is right about the validity of his measure, the fact that it can be calculated 
from observable (or predictable) data about the behaviour of consumers in the aggregate is a 
huge merit – a merit that would be particularly salient to an engineer thinking about the 
practicalities of assessing the costs and benefits of public works. 
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 Despite treating utility as volatile, Dupuit maintains that the concept has a well-
defined meaning: utility is whatever people are willing to pay for.  Thus, the value of any 
item of consumption to the consumer is the surplus of what the consumer is willing to pay 
over what he actually pays:  ‘We see that in general the relative or definitive utility of a 
product is expressed by the difference between the sacrifice which the purchaser would be 
willing to make in order to get it, and the purchase price he has to pay in exchange’ (pp. 262–
263).  Dupuit makes clear that this definition of ‘utility’ is designed for the purposes of 
political economy: 
We say political economy, because this is not, in the last analysis, a rigorous 
measure of the quality which things have of being able to satisfy men’s needs [a 
reference to Say’s definition of utility]; it would be difficult to say whose hunger 
was the greater – the rich man’s, who would be willing to give a million for a 
kilogram of bread, or the poor man’s, who, having nothing else to give, would risk 
his life for it.  But political economy, being concerned only with wealth, can take 
account of the intensity of a wish only through its monetary expression.  Political 
economy only bakes bread for those who can buy it, and leaves to social economy 
the care of supplying it to those with nothing of value to give in exchange.  (p. 
262). 
Notice that Dupuit considers and rejects the idea of measuring the intensity of individuals’ 
desires for consumption or the intensity of the satisfaction they derive from it: his objective is 
simply to measure willingness to pay. 
 Dupuit presents consumers’ surplus (in his terminology, consumers’ ‘relative utility’) 
as a measurement tool that can be useful in providing guidance to legislators in making 
decisions about the provision and pricing of public works (pp. 261, 279).  Repeatedly, he 
describes consumers’ surplus as the sum, over all units actually consumed, of the maximum 
additional tax or toll that could be levied on each unit without preventing it from being 
consumed.  Thus, to calculate the ‘utility of transportation’ of freight on a road system, he 
imagines ‘a traffic tax increasing little by little, which would cause the successive 
disappearance of several of the tons together comprising the 50 million tons being carried on 
these roads’; each ton is then multiplied by ‘the tax which would prevent it from moving’ (p. 
271).  The same principle applies to passenger transport.  He considers the case of a new 
railway which diverts traffic from a lower-priced but slower stagecoach service.  The utility 
gain for rail users is ‘the toll [on railway travel] which would dissuade passengers from 
stepping out of the stagecoach and into the railway carriage’ (p. 274).  It is significant that 
Dupuit uses the same method of utility measurement for freight transport (much of which, 
presumably, is an intermediate good bought by manufacturers and retailers) and for passenger 
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transport (which is often a final consumption good).  This is possible because his concept of 
willingness to pay is not tied to subjective desires or satisfactions: it is simply the highest 
price that a potential buyer would in fact pay. 
 One way of describing Dupuit’s approach is to say that the sum of consumers’ actual 
payments and consumers’ surplus is the maximum amount of money that, in principle, could 
be raised from the sale of the quantity actually consumed using ‘perfect’ price discrimination.  
The problem with this statement, of course, is the need to spell out the meaning of ‘perfect’.  
In modern neoclassical economics, the issue is seen the other way round.  Starting from 
assumptions about well-behaved preferences and utility-maximisation, the neoclassical 
approach defines consumers’ surplus as a sum of compensating variations; perfect price 
discrimination is then defined as pricing that appropriates the whole of this potential surplus.  
But that analysis depends on the assumption that each consumer acts on preferences that are 
integrated and well-behaved.  In contrast, Dupuit seems to want to claim that he has a well-
defined concept of perfect price discrimination, and a method of measuring the revenue it 
would yield, which does not require that assumption. 
 Dupuit’s understanding of the link between consumers’ surplus and price 
discrimination underlies his advocacy of price discrimination as a means of recovering fixed 
costs.  Thus, although the practices of price discrimination used in business work by setting 
‘traps for the buyer’s vanity and his credulity’, he thinks they are often ‘more equitable and 
fairer than one might expect at first sight’ and might be good examples to be followed in 
setting tariffs for public works (p. 261).  Anticipating the content of subsequent (but never 
written) chapters of his book, Dupuit says that he hopes to show how such tariffs can be fixed 
‘according to rational principles, in order to produce the greatest possible utility and at the 
same time a revenue sufficient to cover the cost of upkeep and interest on capital’ (p. 271).  
The implication is that a rational tariff would use price discrimination to recover total costs 
while, as far as possible, not deterring any user who was willing to pay the marginal cost of 
supply. 
 Recall Dupuit’s claim that his concept of utility – that utility is whatever people are 
willing to pay for – is appropriate for political economy because the subject matter of 
political economy is wealth.  The implication seems to be that the production and sale of a 
good is wealth-creating if and only if consumers’ willingness to pay for it exceeds the cost of 
supply.  Thus, if the costs of a proposed public project can be more than recovered by 
discriminatory pricing, that is evidence that the project would create wealth. 
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 This idea emerges clearly in Dupuit’s example of the footbridge.  In this case, the 
‘absolute utility to society’ of the bridge is the total of consumers’ willingness to pay; the 
‘relative utility’ is this total less the costs of maintenance and interest on capital (p. 270).  
Here, by implication, Dupuit means relative utility to society, as contrasted with relative 
utility to consumers (which, as he explains in the passage I quoted earlier, is the excess of 
consumers’ willingness to pay for a good over what they have to spend to buy it).  If the two 
concepts of relative utility are not equal, the difference is the net surplus or profit accruing to 
producers of the good.  Thus, ‘relative utility to society’ corresponds with what, in modern 
cost-benefit analysis, would be called ‘net social benefit’ – the sum of net benefits to 
consumers and producers. 
 In his analysis of (what are now called) pecuniary externalities, Dupuit allows costs 
and benefits to different individuals, if equal and opposite in money value, to cancel out in 
the measurement of public utility.  His leading example is concerned with the measurement 
of the benefits of constructing a canal that will carry coal into an area with no local coal 
deposits.  The opening of the canal causes a fall in the local price of coal.  This benefit of the 
canal is measured by the maximum revenue that in principle could be generated by additional 
taxes on coal traffic on the canal.  But suppose that wood is a locally-produced substitute for 
coal.   Although wood is not carried on the canal, the new supply of coal leads to a fall in the 
local price of wood.  Should the increase in consumers’ surplus on wood count as an 
additional benefit of the canal?  In the earliest statement of what is now recognised as a 
fundamental principle of cost-benefit analysis (see, e.g., Sugden and Williams, 1978, pp. 
134–147), Dupuit argues that the answer is ‘No’, because when a project induces indirect 
effects on market prices, ‘the consumer gains what the producer loses, or vice versa’.  These 
offsetting gains and losses are ‘merely changes in the distribution of wealth’, and so are not 
relevant for ‘the calculation of utility’, even though they are matters of concern for the state 
(p. 272). 
 For Dupuit, then, utility measurement is fundamentally concerned with the amounts 
of money that people are willing to pay for goods, and this willingness to pay is interpreted in 
terms of the maximum revenue that can in principle be generated by discriminatory pricing.  
However, his method of actually making these measurements uses only the data that is 
contained in observable demand functions.  He starts with a demand curve (he calls it a 
‘curve of consumption’) which plots quantities of some good consumed by a population of 
consumers as a function of the price.  I will write this function as x = f(p), where x is quantity 
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consumed and p is price.  Most of Dupuit’s analysis works with the inverse function  p =        
f –1(x).  He interprets ‘quantity’ as numbers of ‘articles’, ranked in inverse order of the highest 
price at which they are bought.  (That is, article 1 is the article that is bought when the price is 
so high that only one article is bought, article 2 is the additional article that is bought at the 
slightly lower price at which exactly two articles are bought, and so on.)  Thus, a value f –1(x) 
is defined for each article.  In modern terminology, this is the marginal valuation of the good, 
or consumers’ marginal willingness to pay for it, evaluated at x.  Dupuit calls it the ‘utility’ of 
the specific article.  Given any price p, the total utility of the quantity f(p) is defined as the 
integral of f –1(x) between 0 and  f(p) (that is, as the sum of the utilities of the articles that are 
consumed).  If consumers’ actual expenditure pf(p) is subtracted from this integral, we arrive 
at Dupuit’s formula for consumers’ surplus.  In deriving this formula, Dupuit makes no 
explicit assumptions about consumers’ behaviour beyond the observations that are described 
by the demand curve itself.  In particular, he makes no explicit assumptions about preferences 
or utility-maximisation.  However, the formula itself is essentially the same as that used in 
modern exercises in practical cost-benefit analysis and in modern definitions of perfect price 
discrimination.  (The main difference is that Dupuit treats the area under an observed demand 
curve as an exact measure of surplus, rather than as a close approximation that may need to 
be corrected to take account of income effects.)  
 Dupuit claims to have developed a coherent concept of consumers’ surplus that does 
not depend on assumptions about integrated preferences.  Viewed in the light of the findings 
of behavioural economics, this claim is of great interest.  However, it has not received much 
attention.  It has been seen as unimportant because, in the dominant neoclassical tradition of 
economics, the assumption of integrated preferences has been treated as unproblematic.  
Thus, those features of Dupuit’s analysis that allow him to avoid making assumptions about 
integrated preferences – particularly his definition of utility in terms of willingness to pay – 
have been seen as obsolete or even confused. 
3.  Dupuit, Walras and the neoclassical concept of consumers’ surplus  
As Dupuit’s treatment of utility is so different from that of neoclassical economics, it is 
perhaps not surprising that it was summarily dismissed by Walras (1900/ 1954) as an 
‘egregious error’ (p. 443).  Walras recognises that, for Dupuit, the ‘measure of utility’ is ‘the 
maximum pecuniary sacrifice which a consumer is willing to make in order to procure a unit 
of product’, and he explains how Dupuit measures total utility by ‘aggregating layers of gross 
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receipts’ at different prices.  Walras’s criticism seems not to be directed at Dupuit’s method 
of measuring maximum pecuniary sacrifice, but rather at the claim that this is a measure of 
utility: 
To be sure, the maximum pecuniary sacrifice which a consumer is willing to make 
in order to obtain a bottle of wine, for instance, depends in part on the utility of this 
bottle of wine for the consumer… .  [But in general] the maximum pecuniary 
sacrifice which a consumer is willing to make in order to obtain a unit of a product 
depends not only on the utility of the product in question, but also on the utility of 
all the other products in the market, and, finally, on the consumer’s means.  (p. 
445). 
Thus:  
We may, therefore, definitely reject all Dupuit’s statements in his two memoirs 
which bear upon the variation of utility as price varies and as the quantity 
demanded varies from price to price.  [These statements] rest on a confusion of 
ideas resulting from Dupuit’s complete failure to distinguish between utility or 
want curves on the one hand, and demand curves on the other.  (p. 446)   
 There seems to be general agreement among historians of economic thought that 
Walras was ungenerous in not recognising Dupuit’s achievement in developing the first 
theoretical analysis of consumers’ surplus.  Nevertheless, Walras’s criticisms are usually seen 
as broadly correct.  For example, Ekelund and Hébert (1985: 422–423) say that Dupuit failed 
to distinguish between marginal utility curves and demand curves, with the result that his 
consumers’ surplus measure ‘tends to misstate true utility’.  Tubaro (2006: 11) says that 
Dupuit’s writings are ‘somewhat confused about the distinction between utility and demand’.   
Houghton (1958) is more ambivalent, saying that ‘Dupuit’s implied confusion 
(identification?) of demand and utility curves’ was ‘a much less serious blunder 
(abstraction?) than Walras believed’.  (I take it that Houghton does not want to assert that 
Dupuit’s analysis was confused or erroneous, but still sees the absence of a distinction 
between utility and demand as a weakness that later theorists have overcome.) 
 The consensus account of the evolution of the theory of consumers’ surplus is 
encapsulated in Ekelund and Hébert’s (1985: 445) metaphor of an upward climb of progress 
with three ‘plateaus’ of achievement, successively reached by Dupuit, Marshall (1900) and 
Hicks (1941).  Marshall’s advance on Dupuit was to distinguish between utility and demand 
and to derive the conditions under which Dupuit’s measure of surplus is a correct money 
measure of the utility that an individual derives from a good – namely that the individual’s 
tastes, the individual’s marginal utility of income, and the prices of other goods all remain 
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constant.2  Hicks’s advance on Marshall was to use ordinal rather than cardinal utility and to 
derive Marshall’s concept of surplus as a special case of the concept of compensating 
variation.   
 Notice, however, that the advances made by Marshall and Hicks work by assimilating 
Dupuit’s analysis to a theoretical framework in which consumers’ choices are rational, 
rationality being modelled as the maximisation of utility (or, equivalently, as choosing what 
is ranked highest in a preference ordering that can be represented by a utility function).  In 
this framework, utility is a more fundamental concept than demand, because demand 
functions can be derived from utility functions and budget constraints by solving constrained 
maximisation problems.  Marshall and Hicks are able to state and prove theorems that cannot 
be expressed in Dupuit’s framework.  But how far these theorems are useful advances 
depends on how successfully the hypothesis of utility maximisation explains consumers’ 
actual choices.  If in fact those choices reveal integrated and neoclassically well-behaved 
preferences, Dupuit’s analysis might reasonably be said to have been superseded by later 
developments.  But if they do not, Dupuit’s concept of utility as whatever people are willing 
to pay for might be more useful than the neoclassical concepts that replaced it. 
4.  Was Dupuit right?  The corner-shop model 
In this section, I consider whether Dupuit was justified in claiming that his measure of 
consumers’ surplus is valid even if consumer behaviour is volatile.  I do this by developing a 
model which displays three different concepts of the ‘absolute utility’ that an individual 
consumer derives from consuming a given quantity of a good.  The first concept is Dupuit’s 
measure – the area under the observed demand curve.  The second concept is willingness to 
pay, interpreted as the maximum revenue that can in principle be appropriated from the sale 
of the relevant quantity of the good by pre-announced discriminatory pricing.  Dupuit 
effectively treats these two concepts as equivalent.  The third concept is the experienced 
utility – utility in the classical utilitarian sense of hedonic experience – enjoyed by the 
consumer.  Experienced utility is a close relative of a concept that Dupuit considers but 
judges inappropriate for political economy – the degree to which the consumer’s needs are 
satisfied.  My object is to investigate the relationships between these three concepts when the 
                                                          
2
 Houghton (1985) argues convincingly that these developments by Marshall were anticipated by 




consumer does not act on integrated preferences.  In particular, I am interested in whether 
Dupuit’s measure is equivalent to willingness to pay. 
 The name I have given my model alludes to an era when, for most people living in 
towns, there were small grocery shops (often on street corners) within a few minutes’ walk of 
their homes.  This made it possible for people to delay buying items of household 
consumption until the moment they were actually needed.  The model is of one consumer’s 
decisions over three periods, t = 1, 2, 3 (or morning, afternoon and evening), of a single day.  
There are two goods, money and food.  At the start of the first period, the consumer is 
endowed with money but no food.  Food comes in discrete units.  In each period t, the 
consumer must consume either zero units of food (denoted by xt = 0) or one unit (xt = 1).  
There is a tariff which specifies, for each period, the terms on which money can be 
exchanged for food.  Food that is bought in one period can either be consumed in that period 
or costlessly stored for later consumption.  At the prices that will be considered in the model, 
the consumer always has more than enough money to buy as much food as she can use, but 
she also derives utility from money that is not spent on food.  (As a convenient and harmless 
simplification, I assume that the consumer is not permitted to buy food that she does not 
consume, even if the price is zero.)  The problem is to define and measure the ‘absolute 
utility’ that the consumer would derive if the price of food were zero in every period. 
 I assume that in period 1, the consumer’s experienced utility is g1(x1) – o1, where o1 is 
her outlay of money for the purchase of food in that period; g1(x1) is her gross utility in that 
period.  In period 2, her experienced utility is g2(x1, x2) – o2; in period 3 it is g3(x1, x2, x3) – o3.  
This specification allows the gross utility derived from consumption in one period to depend 
on previous consumption.  (For example, the individual may get more utility from eating, the 
hungrier she is at the time.)  I assume that, in each period t, gross utility is greater (other 
things being equal) if xt = 1 than if xt = 0.  I normalise by setting g1(0) + g2(0, 0) + g3(0, 0, 0) 
= 0.  Notice that this specification implicitly assumes that the marginal utility of money is 
constant, and measures utility in money units.  This abstracts from the complications that 
would be generated by income effects.  I define AE, the experienced-utility measure of the 
gross (or ‘absolute’) utility derived from consuming in all three periods, as g1(1) + g2(1, 1) + 




 I define a demand function in terms of the consumer’s total purchases of food over the 
day, conditional on the tariff having a unitary price structure – that is, there is a single price 
that applies to all units of food purchased in all periods.  This function is written as X = f(p) 
where X is the total quantity of food bought in the three periods combined and p is the unit 
price.  This function is fully described by the triple (h1, h2, h3) where h1, h2 and h3 are 
respectively the highest prices at which the consumer would buy 1, 2 and 3 units.  Thus AD, 
Dupuit’s measure of the absolute utility derived from consuming in all three periods, is h1 + 
h2 + h3. 
 As a starting point, I consider the neoclassical case in which the consumer acts on the 
decision rule of maximising the sum of experienced utility over the three periods – that is, 
maximising g1(x1) + g2(x1, x2) + g3(x1, x2, x3) – (o1 + o2 + o3).  It is convenient to define G(X) 
as the maximum value of g1(x1) + g2(x1, x2) + g3(x1, x2, x3) that can be achieved, given that the 
quantities purchased in the three periods sum to X.  Thus, since no more than three units of 
the good can be bought, the experienced-utility measure of absolute utility is given by AE = 
G(3).  
 Now consider the consumer’s demand function.  Since this is defined with reference 
to a unitary price structure, the decision rule from which this function is derived can be 
expressed as the maximisation of G(X) – pX.  In this formulation, the problem of optimising 
the distribution of consumption over the day is hidden from view; the consumer is 
represented as choosing consumption for the day, given the unit price for the day.  This is an 
entirely standard neoclassical decision problem in which the consumer acts on integrated 
preferences.  Since income effects have been assumed to be zero, it follows from well-known 
results about consumers’ surplus that Dupuit’s measure AD of the area under the demand 
curve is equal to the experienced-utility measure AE. 
 Here is one way of explaining why this is so.  Consider any two prices p and p – ∆p, 
where ∆p is a very small positive number.  Let X and X + ∆X respectively denote the 
consumer’s chosen consumption at prices p and p – ∆p.  The increase in her experienced 
utility as a result of the fall in the price must be at least X∆p, because she has the option of 
consuming X at the lower price.  But this increase cannot be greater than (X + ∆X)∆p, because 
she has the option of consuming X + ∆X at the higher price.  Now take some price p* at 
which chosen consumption is zero.  Clearly, experienced utility is zero at this price.  Consider 
the effect of reducing the price from p* to zero in a sequence of very small changes.  It 
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follows from the argument I have just given that the total increase in experienced utility is 
approximately equal to the area under the demand curve, and that the two measures approach 
one another as the price increments used in the calculation approach zero.  Thus, AD = AE.   
Notice that this argument depends not only on the assumed absence of income effects and on 
the measurement of utility in money units, but also (and crucially) on the assumption that the 
consumer maximises experienced utility. 
 What about the willingness-to-pay measure of absolute utility?  Recall that this 
measure, which I will write as AW, is the maximum revenue that can be appropriated by pre-
announced discriminatory pricing.  Given the assumption that the consumer maximises 
experienced utility, it is immediately obvious that AW = AE.  Since the consumer always has 
the option of not consuming and thereby getting zero experienced utility, she will not consent 
to pay more than AE to consume three units.  But if she faces a tariff with a fixed charge of AE 
and a marginal charge of zero per unit consumed, she will be indifferent between accepting 
and rejecting the offer.  Thus, in the neoclassical case, AW = AE = AD.  
 I now consider a different possibility.  This is that the consumer’s decision rule is 
myopic: in each period, she maximises experienced utility in that period.  In general (and as 
will emerge from my analysis), this rule does not generate choices that reveal integrated 
preferences.  I will investigate the implications of this decision rule in combination with three 
alternative assumptions about experienced utility. 
 In Specification 1, experienced utility is separable in the following sense: in each 
period, gross utility depends only on consumption in that period.  In other words, the value of 
g2(x1, x2) is independent of x1 and the value of g3(x1, x2, x3) is independent of x1 and x2.  I also 
stipulate that gross utility is zero in any period t in which xt = 0.  It is easy to see that, under 
this specification, the demand function for a myopic consumer is exactly the same as it would 
be for a neoclassical consumer.3  Thus, as in the neoclassical case, AD = AE.  It is also easy to 
see that AE
  
can be appropriated by a tariff in which, in each period, the unit price is equal to 
the gross utility of one unit of consumption in that period, and that no more than this can be 
appropriated.  Thus, again as in the neoclassical case, AW = AE.  So AD
 
= AW: Dupuit’s 
measure of absolute utility is equivalent to willingness to pay. 
                                                          
3
 Recall that the demand function is defined with respect to a unitary price structure.  In such a price 
structure, there is no advantage in buying a unit of food before the period in which it is consumed.  If 
unit prices differed between periods, a myopic consumer would not take up advantageous 




 In Specification 2, experienced utility is characterised by diminishing satisfaction.  
The experienced utility of any unit of food is fully determined by whether it is the first, 
second or third unit consumed in the day (irrespective of the period in which it is consumed); 
the first unit gives most utility and the third unit gives the least.  Thus g1(1) = g2(0, 1) = g3(0, 
0, 1) > g2(1, 1) = g3(0, 1, 1) = g3(1, 0, 1) > g3(1, 1, 1).  Again, I stipulate that gross utility is 
zero in any period t in which xt = 0.  As in Specification 1, the demand function for a myopic 
consumer is the same as it would be for a neoclassical consumer; this function is defined by 
values of h1, h2 and h3 that are respectively equal to the experienced utilities of the first, 
second and third units consumed in the day.  Thus AD = AE.  The maximum revenue that can 
be appropriated is AE; this can be appropriated by a tariff which charges h1 for the first unit 
consumed in the day, h2 for the second and h3 for the third.  Thus, as in Specification 1, AW = 
AE.  Again, Dupuit’s measure of absolute utility is equivalent to willingness to pay.     
 In Specification 3, experienced utility is characterised by increasing deprivation.  The 
gross utility of consuming a unit of food is independent of previous consumption and is the 
same in all periods.  However, the gross utility of not consuming food in any period is 
determined by the number of periods that have elapsed since the last consumption of food (or 
since the start of the day if there has been no previous consumption).  The greater the number 
of such periods, the less is the gross utility.  To simplify the exposition, and because my 
purpose is to exhibit a counter-example to the supposition that AW = AE = AD, I will use a 
numerical example.  In this example, the gross utility of consuming a unit of food in any 
period is 2.  The gross utility of not consuming is 1 if no periods have elapsed since the last 
period of consumption; it is 0 if one such period has elapsed; and it is –1 if two such periods 
have elapsed.  Thus (using * to denote that the relevant variable can take either of the values 
0 or 1): 
 g1(1) = g2(*, 1) = g3(*, *, 1) = 2; 
 g1(0) = g2(1, 0) = g3(*, 1, 0) = 1; 
 g2(0, 0) = g3(1, 0, 0) = 0; 
 g3(0, 0, 0) = – 1.      
Notice that the normalisation g1(0) + g2(0, 0) + g3(0, 0, 0) = 0 is preserved. 
 As a benchmark, it is useful to consider the demand function of a neoclassical 
consumer, given this specification of experienced utility.  If a utility-maximising consumer 
chooses not to buy any food, her total gross utility will be zero.  If she chooses to buy exactly 
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one unit of food, she will consume it in period 2, getting a total of 4 units of gross utility.  If 
she chooses to buy exactly two units, she will be indifferent about when she consumes them, 
and will get a total gross utility of 5.  If she buys three units, her total gross utility will be 6.  
From the preceding propositions, it is easy to work out that the demand function is given by 
h1 = 4, h2 = 1, h3 = 1.  Since we are dealing with a neoclassical consumer, we can conclude 
that AW = AE = AD = 6. 
 But now consider the myopic consumer.  As a first step, I derive her demand function.  
To avoid unnecessary complications, I assume that if buying and not buying give the same 
utility, the consumer buys.   If p ≤ 1, the consumer will buy one unit in each period.  If 1 < p 
≤ 2, she will not buy in period 1, but she will buy in period 2.  Having consumed in period 2, 
she will not buy in period 3.  If  2 < p ≤ 3, she will not buy in periods 1 and 2, but she will 
buy in period 3.  If p > 3, she will not buy at all.  Thus, the demand function is described by 
h1 = 3, h2 = 1, h3 = 1.  So AD, Dupuit’s measure of absolute utility as the area under the 
demand curve, is 5.  This is despite the fact that AE, the experienced-utility measure of 
absolute utility, is 6. 
 What about AW, the willingness-to-pay measure of absolute utility?  It turns out that 
no tariff can appropriate more than 3.  Suppose that the consumer is induced to consume in 
all three periods.  To be induced to consume in period 1, she must be able to buy one unit in 
period 1 at a price no greater than 1.  Given that she has consumed in period 1, if she is to be 
induced to consume in period 2, she must be able to buy one unit in period 2 at a price no 
greater than 1.  And similarly for period 3.  So the maximum surplus that can be appropriated 
is 3.  Similar reasoning establishes that the maximum surplus that can be appropriated is also 
3 if the consumer is induced to consume exactly two units, or if she is induced to consume 
exactly one unit. 
 The implication is that if consumers act on non-integrated preferences, Dupuit’s 
measure of absolute utility using observable demand data does not always correspond with 
the potential yield of perfectly discriminatory pricing.  I have conjectured that Dupuit thought 
that the two measures necessarily coincide.  If this conjecture is correct, one possibility is 
that, despite his remarks about the volatile will of human beings, Dupuit assumed that human 
beings act on integrated preferences.  Another possibility, which is perhaps more consistent 
with the text, is that he had in mind some less restrictive assumption about behaviour which 
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would be sufficient to imply the equivalence of the two measures.  My Specifications 1 and 2 
are examples of such assumptions.  Or, of course, he could simply have been mistaken. 
5.  Conclusion 
From my point of view, as an economic theorist rather than an historian of thought, it is more 
important to focus on Dupuit’s guiding principle, that the only real utility is that which people 
are willing to pay for.  I have argued that this principle is best understood as implying that the 
gross benefit (or ‘absolute utility’) resulting from the consumption of a given quantity of a 
good is the maximum revenue that could be raised from the sale of that quantity at perfectly 
discriminating pre-announced prices.  Dupuit’s principle coheres with an approach to 
normative economics which aims at ensuring that individuals are able to get what they want 
and are willing to pay for, when they want it and are willing to pay for it – whether or not 
they act on integrated preferences. 
 I began work on this topic with the expectation that, in the absence of income effects, 
this willingness-to-pay measure of benefit would be equal to the area under the observed 
demand curve.  My analysis has shown that, in general, that expectation is false.  However, I 
believe that it has shown that the measure itself can be well-defined and capable of being 
calculated from observable data even when consumers do not act on integrated preferences.  
‘Specification 3’ of the model of myopic choice presented in Section 4 is an illuminating test 
case.  In this case, the area under the demand curve is 5, but the maximum yield of 
discriminatory pricing is 3.  The difference between the two measures reflects the fact that, 
because the myopic consumer is never willing to pay for experiences that will occur in the 
future, there is no consumption profile for which the individual is willing to pay a total of 
more than 3.  If the only real utility is that which people are willing to pay for, no 
consumption profile can be worth more than 3.  I guess that some readers will conclude that 
this example illustrates the limitations of Dupuit’s principle.  But I am still inclined to 
endorse the principle and accept its implications. 
 
References 
Ariely, Dan, George Loewenstein, and Drazen Prelec (2003).  Coherent arbitrariness: stable 




Auspitz, Rudolf and Richard Lieben (1889).  Untersuchungen über die Theorie des Preises 
(Berlin: Duncker and Humblot). 
Becker, Gordon M., Morris H. DeGroot and Jacob Marschak, (1964) “Measuring utility by 
a single-response sequential method”, Behavioural Science, 9, 226-232. 
Bernheim, Douglas and Antonio Rangel (2007).  Toward choice-theoretic foundations for 
behavioral welfare economics.  American Economic Review: Papers and 
Proceedings 97: 464–470. 
Buchanan, James M. (1968).  The Demand and Supply of Public Goods.  Chicago: Rand 
McNally.  
Buchanan, James M. (1975).  The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan.  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Dupuit, Jules (1844/ 1952).  On the measurement of the utility of public works.  
International Economic Papers 2 (1952): 83–110.  Translated by R.H. Barback.  
First published in French in 1844.  (Page references to reprint in Cost-Benefit  
Ekelund, Robert and Robert Hébert (1985).  Consumer surplus: the first hundred years.  
History of Political Economy 17: 419–454. 
Hicks, John (1941).  The rehabilitation of consumer’s surplus.  Review of Economic Studies  
8: 108-116. 
Houghton, R.W. (1958).   A note on the early history of consumer's surplus.  Economica 25: 
49–57 
Infante, Gerardo, Guilhem Lecouteux and Robert Sugden (2015).  Preference purification and 
the inner rational agent: a critique of the conventional wisdom of behavioural welfare 
economics.  Journal of Economic Methodology, forthcoming. 
Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky (1979).  Prospect theory: an analysis of decision 
under risk.  Econometrica 47: 263-291. 
Kőszegi, Botond and Matthew Rabin (2007).  Mistakes in choice-based welfare analysis.  
American Economic Review 97: 477–481. 
Loomes, Graham, Peter G. Moffatt and Robert Sugden (2002).  A microeconometric test 




Lowenstein, George (2005).  Hot-cold empathy gaps and medical decision making.  
Health Psychology 24 (4): S49–S56. 
McQuillin, Ben and Robert Sugden (2012).  How the market responds to dynamically 
inconsistent preferences.  Social Choice and Welfare 38: 617–634. 
Marshall, Alfred (1890).  Principles of Economics (London: Macmillan). 
Schelling, Thomas C. (1984).  Self-command in practice, in policy, and in a theory of 
rational choice.  American Economic Review 74 (2): 1–11. 
Slovic, Paul and Sarah Lichtenstein (1968).  Relative importance of probabilities and 
payoffs in risk taking.  Journal of Experimental Psychology 78, 1–18. 
Strotz, R.H. (1955-56).  Myopia and inconsistency in dynamic utility maximisation.”  
Review of Economic Studies, 23: 165-180. 
Sunstein, Cass R. and Richard H. Thaler (2003).  Libertarian paternalism is not an 
oxymoron.  University of Chicago Law Review, 70: 1159–1202. 
Sugden, Robert (2004).  The opportunity criterion: consumer sovereignty without the 
assumption of coherent preferences.  American Economic Review 94: 1014–1033. 
Sugden, Robert (2007).  The value of opportunities over time when preferences are unstable.  
Social Choice and Welfare 29: 665–682. 
Sugden, Robert (2013).  The behavioural economist and the social planner: to whom should 
behavioural welfare economics be addressed?  Inquiry 56 (2013): 519–538. 
Sugden, Robert and Alan Williams (1978).  The Principles of Practical Cost-benefit Analysis.  
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Tubaro, Paola (2006).  Jules Dupuit’s contribution to mathematical economics.  Unpublished 
manuscript, Université Paris X.  http://economix.fr/pdf/journees/hpe/2006-06-
16_Tubaro.pdf. 
Walras, Léon (1900/1954).  Elements of Pure Economics, fourth edition.  London: Routledge.  
Translated by William Jaffé.  First published in French 1900.  First edition 1874.  
